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Abstract— We study the traffic routing game among a large
number of selfish drivers over a traffic network. We consider
a specific scenario where the strategic drivers can be classified
into teams, where drivers in the same team have identical
payoff functions. An incentive mechanism is considered to
mitigate congestion, where each driver is subject to dynamic tax
penalties. We explore a special case in which the tax is affine in
the logarithm of the number of drivers selecting the same route
from each team. It is shown via a mean-field approximation that
a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a large population can be
found by linearly solvable algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transportation is a major energy consuming sector in the
United States, accounting for 28% of total use and 26% of
green-house emissions [1]. The economic loss due to traffic
congestion is also significant; in 2014, it was estimated to
account for $160 billion [2]. Recently, new stakeholders
such as ride-hailing companies and mobile routing apps
are reported to have substantial impacts on urban traffic
networks [3]. Therefore, novel theoretical frameworks for
traffic analysis and control in which ride-hailing companies
act as decision-makers are urgently needed.
A traffic system can be analyzed by the theory of dynamic
games, where the non-cooperative drivers compete over the
shared network [4], [5]. Strategic behaviour of individuals
often results in a game theoretic equilibrium that is not
necessarily socially optimal. In the literature, the loss of op-
timality (efficiency loss) is commonly measured in terms of
the price of anarchy (PoA) [6], [7]. POA can be improved by
an appropriate incentive design; [8], [9] considered dynamic
toll mechanisms, which are assumed to be operated by a
Traffic System Operator (TSO).
It should be noted that incentive mechanisms operated by
TSOs are restricted by the information available to them. For
example, [10], [11] consider fixed taxation for each route
based on the full characterization of the network topology
and user demands. In contrast, [12] proposed a tax structure
which is independent of this information. A complete review
of the design and evaluation of road network pricing schemes
is provided in [13].
Traffic systems in reality typically consist of a large
number of strategic drivers and their game-theoretic analysis
is often computationally challenging. Therefore, an incentive
mechanism should ideally be designed in such a way that
AR. Pedram is with Mechanical Engineering, University of Texas at
Austin, TX, USA apedram@utexas.edu
T. Tanaka is with Department of Aerospace Engineering and
Engineering Mechanics, University of Texas at Austin, TX, USA
ttanaka@utexas.edu
(i) its implementation is computationally simple so that
it is scalable to large networks, and (ii) there exists a
simple computational procedure to find an equilibrium in the
resulting dynamic game. If the later condition is not satisfied,
it is questionable that drivers in reality can ever take the
equilibrium strategy.
To simplify the analysis of routing games with a large
number of drivers, a common approach is to adopt a macro-
scopic perspective, where the density of the vehicles is
modeled rather than the dynamics of individual vehicles
[14]. In a similar spirit, recently the framework of Mean
Field Game (MFG) [15] was applied to compute the traffic
density propagation induced from the interactions of many
independent strategic drivers. Despite the substantial progress
in MFGs, the number of papers utilize the MFG theory
for macroscopic traffic modelling is still limited. Some
recent studies have explored MFGs with multiple classes of
drivers [16], which is appropriate to model traffic games.
Additionally, some papers have considered scenarios with a
major player and a large number of minor players [17].
In MFG setting, the traffic flow is modeled as a fluid
whose behavior can be obtained by solving Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation coupled with the standard conserva-
tion law applied to the vehicles, refered to as Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogrov (FPK) equation. In [18], an MFG approach is
taken to address multi-lane traffic management, using a semi-
Lagrangian scheme to solve an approximation of a coupled
HJB-FPK.
In [19], [20], a discrete-time dynamic stochastic game
over an urban network is studied, wherein at each inter-
section, each strategic driver selects one of the outgoing
links randomly with respect to his/her mixed policy. A tax
mechanism is offered which yields a linearly solvable game
under the assumptions that all drivers have common origin
and destination (O/D) and travel costs. Then, the backward
HJB and forward FPK equations can be solved independently
and thus a MFE is obtained through a linearly-solvable set of
equations. This result [19] has an important computational
advantage with respect to previous results [15] which dealt
with a coupled set of HBJ-FPK equations. However, the
simplified problem setting in [19] with shared pair of (O/D)
and travel cost has a limited applicability to practical traffic
routing problems. To address this gap, in this paper, we
consider more realistic settings, in which there exist multiple
teams with different (O/D) pairs and travel costs. As the
main technical contribution of this paper, a Nash equilibrium
(NE) in the limit of a large number of drivers (MFE) for the
multi-team setting is given as the solution to a set of linearly
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solvable optimal control problems.
This paper is organized as follows: The multi-team road
traffic game is set up in Section II, the behavior of the
game in large population limit is studied in Section III-A.
An auxiliary set of control problems is introduced in Section
III-B which is used to solve the game in the large population
limit in Section III-C. The game with finite number of
drivers is considered in Section III-D. Numerical studies are
summarized in Section IV before we conclude in Section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We assume there is a large number of drivers traveling over
a shared network G = (V, E), referred to as the traffic graph,
where V = {1, 2, . . . , V } is the set of nodes (intersections)
and E = {1, 2, . . . , E} is the set of directed edges (links).
The set of nodes to which there exist a direct link from i is
labeled by V(i). We assume that drivers are categorized into
L teams, and that drivers from the same team have the same
(O/D) pair. The number of drivers in each team is denoted
by Nl ∀l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}. At each time step t ∈ T =
{0, 1, . . . , T −1}, the node at which the n-th driver from the
l-th team (n ≤ Nl) is located is represented by in,l,t ∈ V .
A. Routing policy
For each n and l, in,l,t is a random process. Let Pn,l,t =
{P in,l,t}i∈V be the probability distribution of the individual
driver n in the team l and over the nodes of the traffic graph
at time t. At t = 0, we assume all drivers in the same team
will start from a common probability Pl,0; however, in,l,0
for each n and l is realized independently with respect to
Pl,0.
For (n1, l1) 6= (n2, l2), we assume in1,l1,t and in2,l2,t are
independent random variables. At every time step, driver
(n, l) selects an action jn,l,t ∈ V(in,l,t), and moves to
the node jn,l,t at time t + 1 (i.e. in,l,t+1 = jn,l,t). Each
driver would follow a randomized policy (strategy) Qin,l,t =
{Qijn,l,t}j∈V(i), which represents the probability distribution
according to which she chooses her next destination. Let
∆J be the J-dimensional probability simplex. Then for all
drivers (n, l) at time t, Qn,l,t = {Qin,l,t}i∈V belongs to the
space of possible mixed strategies Q, where
Q =
{
{Qi}i∈V : Qi ∈ ∆|V(i)|−1 ∀i ∈ V
}
.
We assume that each driver fixes her strategy {Qn,l,t}t∈T , at
t = 0 based on the global knowledge the game’s parameters
and she will not be able to update it during the game. In this
setting, the location probability distribution for driver (n, l)
is computed recursively by
P jn,l,t+1 =
∑
i
P in,l,t Q
ij
n,l,t, (1)
with initial Pn,l,t = Pl,0. Further details of the game setup
are given below. Note that they are natural generalizations
of the setup studied in [19] to multi-team scenarios.
B. Cost Functions and Congestion-reducing Incentives
Each driver is subjected to two different categories of
costs– travel cost and congestion cost.
1) Travel cost: Moving from node i to j requires a fixed
amount of cost e.g., fuel cost. Let Cijl,t be a given cost for
drivers in team l to take this action at time t.
2) Congestion cost: This is the tax cost imposed by the
TSO to incentivize drivers to adopt a nominal routing policy,
which we assume it is pre-specified. The nominal policy is
denoted by Rijt , representing the probability of selecting the
next destination j at node i at time step t. Namely, Rijt
satisfies Rijt ≥ 0 and
∑
j R
ij
t = 1. To penalize the deviation
from this reference distribution, TSO introduces the log-
population tax mechanism in which (n, l)-th driver taking
action j at time t from node i will be charged the value of
piijn,l,t =
L∑
m=1
alm
(
log(
Kijm,t
Kim,t
)− logRijt
)
, (2)
where Kim,t denotes the population of drivers (including
driver (n, l) in the case of m = l) from each team in node i
at time t. Similarily, Kijm,t represents the number of drivers
(from team m) who are at node i at time t and willing to take
the action j. We consider the tax formula (2) mainly because
(i) it is a natural extension of the mechanism in [19] and (ii)
the resulting game is efficiently solvable, as we will see in
Section III.
The tax mechanism (2) implies that the driver (n, l) select-
ing action j will be penalized if the fraction of drivers taking
this action is greater than the desired value and it will be
rewarded otherwise. The tax penalty (2) is the weighted sum
of charges associated with individual teams’ deviation from
the nominal routing policy. The parameter alm > 0 means
that the drivers in team l will be penalized by selecting action
j at node i if the road from i to j is going to be overpopulated
by the drivers from team m. Notice that Kim,t ≥ Kijm,t ≥ 0
by construction. We adopt the convention that log( 00 ) = 0. In
this setting, each driver is trying to minimize the expected
value of the tax cost i.e., Πijn,l,t , E[pi
ij
n,l,t|in,l,t, jn,l,t] as
well as fixed costs. In summary, each driver is willing to
minimize her own charge selfishly by solving:
min
{Qn,l,t}T−10
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,l,tQ
ij
n,l,t(C
ij
n,l,t + Π
ij
n,l,t)
s.t
∑
j
Qijl,t = 1 ∀i.
(3)
Notice that (3) is a game involving
∑L
l=1Nl players, since
the value of Πijn,l,t depends on the strategies of all other
drivers in the system. Analyzing this game is a nontrivial
task. However, if the number of drivers is sufficiently large,
the game is well-approximated by the one with infinitely
many drivers. In the next section, we develope such an
approximation via the MFG theory.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we study the MFG approximation of the
game with a large number of drivers. Then, an efficient
algorithm is provided to calculate the MFE of the game.
A. Large population limit
In [19], for the case of single team, an explicit expression
for limN→∞Πn,t is obtained. Here, we provide a generalized
alternative method to find an analogous limit for the multi-
team case.
Due to the indistinguishability of drivers in a team, we can
restrict ourselves to the symmetric setups where drivers in a
team are sharing a common policy Ql = {Qi}i∈V,t∈T ,l∈Nl .
Denoting the adapted strategy by Q∗l , one can calculate the
induced probability distribution P ∗l , based on (1). In what
follows, we study the asymptotic behavior of the congestion
charge in the large population limit (i.e., N =
∑
mNm →∞
for the fixed population ratios NlN ).
Lemma 1: If P i∗l,tQ
ij∗
l,t > 0 ∀l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, then
lim
N→∞
Πijn,l,t =
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,t
Rijt
. (4)
Proof: See appendix A.
Therefore, in the large population limit, the optimal response
of (n, l)-th driver is characterized by:
argmin
{Qn,l}T−10
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,l,tQ
ij
n,l,t(C
ij
l,t +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,t
Rijt
)
s.t
∑
j
Qijl,t = 1 ∀i, (5)
where the probability distribution Pn,l,t propagates with
respect to (1). In what follows, we show that Q∗ is indeed
an MFG of multi-team traffic routing game if the minimizer
of (5) is again Q∗n,l (That is, Q
∗ is a fixed point). In the next
subsection, we study auxiliary L-player game by which such
a fixed policy is found.
B. Auxiliary optimization problem
Consider an auxiliary L-player game in which each team
tries to find her optimum policy Qij∗l , the solution to:
min
{Ql}T−10
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P il,t Q
ij
l,t(C
ij
l,t +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qijm,t
Rijt
)
s.t
∑
j
Qijl,t = 1 ∀i.
(6)
Notice that in (5) the logarithmic term is fixed, in contrast to
(6) where it is an optimization variable. For each t ∈ T , one
can introduce value function associated with optimal control
problem (6) as:
Vl,t(Pl,t)= min
{Ql}T−10
T−1∑
τ=t
∑
i,j
P il,τQ
ij
l,τ (C
ij
l,τ+
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qijm,t
Rijt
).
The value function satisfies the following coupled Bellman
equations:
Vl,t(Pl,t) = min
Ql,t
{∑
i,j
P il,t Q
ij
l,t(C
ij
l,t +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qijm,t
Rijt
)
+ Vl,t+1(Pl,t+1)
}
, (7)
with Vl,T (Pl,T ) = 0 ∀l, Pl,T . The first main result of
this paper is summarized by the following Theorem 1. It
states that this set of optimal control problems (6) is linearly
solvable, which means the solution is obtained by solving a
linear system.
Theorem 1: Let {λl,t}t∈T be sequences of V-
dimensional vectors, {φl,t}t∈T be sequences of V×V-
dimensional matrices, and A be an invertible matrix whose
(l,m)-th element is alm. Then, optimal policies {Qij∗l,t }t∈T
can be iteratively calculated by Algorithm 1. Moreover, the
value functions for each t ∈ T are
Vl,t(Pl,t) =
∑
i
P il,t(−all − λil,t).
Proof: See appendix B.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Strategy Computation for T-stage Road
Traffic Game
1: Initialize φijl,T−1 = C
ij
l,T−1 for all i, j ∈ V
2: for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 0 do
3: for all i, j ∈ V , compute:
M ijt =
M
ij
1,t
...
M ijL,t
 := A−1
−a11 − φ
ij
1,t
...
−aLL − φijL,t

4: for every i ∈ V , compute:
Λit =
λ
i
1,t
...
λiL,t
 := A
log(
∑
j R
ij
t expM
ij
1,t)
...
log(
∑
j R
ij
t expM
ij
L,t)

5: for every i, j ∈ V , compute the optimal policies:
Qij∗l,t = R
ij
l,t exp (M
ij
l,t −
∑
m
A−1l,mλ
i
m,t)
φijl,t−1 = C
ij
l,t−1 − all − λjl,t
6: end for
7: return {Qij∗l,t }t∈T , {λil,t}t∈T and{φijl,t}t∈T .
We stress that Algorithm 1 is linear in φ and λ and thus
the optimal solution can be pre-computed backward in time.
C. Equilibrium in the large population limit
Here, we find the equilibrium point of the game with
a large number of drivers. It is noteworthy that Πijn,l,t, as
proved in [19], is independent of the (n, l)-th driver’s own
strategy Qijn,l,t, even for finite N . In this game, each strategic
driver wants to minimize her cost function, given by
J(n,l)(Qn,l, Q−(n,l)) =
T−1∑
t=0
∑
i,j
P in,l,tQ
ij
n,l,t(C
ij
n,l,t + Π
ij
n,l,t),
where Qn,l = {Qn,l,t}t∈T denotes her policy and
{Πijn,l,t}t∈T is determined by other drivers’ policy Q−(n,l) =
{Qn˜,l˜,t}t∈T ,∀(n˜,l˜) 6=(n,l).
Definition 1: The set of strategies
{QNEn,l }l=1,2,...,L,n=1,2,...,nl is said to be a NE if the
following inequalities hold.
J(n,l)(Qn,l, Q
NE
−(n,l)) ≥ J(n,l)(QNEn,l , QNE−(n,l)) ∀(n, l)
As a candidate of NE in the limit of N →∞ , we consider
Qij∗l,t , the solution to (6). To validate this guess, let’s consider
all drivers except (n, l) adopt Qij∗l,t and see if it statisfies
the condition in Definition 1. One can again apply dynamic
programming and define the value function for (5) as:
V˜n,l,t(Pn,l,t) =
min
{Qn,l}T−10
T−1∑
τ=t
∑
i,j
P in,l,τQ
ij
n,l,τ (C
ij
l,τ +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,t
Rijt
),
and the associated Bellman equation will be
V˜n,l,t(Pn,l,t) = min
Qn,l,t
{∑
i,j
P in,l,tQ
ij
n,l,t(C
ij
l,t
+
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,t
Rijt
) + V˜n,l,t+1(Pn,l,t+1)
}
. (8)
Note that V and V˜ are value functions associated with
different optimal control problems.
Lemma 2: For all t ∈ T and any given Pn,l,t,
V˜n,l,t(Pn,l,t) = Vl,t(Pn,l,t). Moreover, an arbitrary policy
{Qn,l,t}t∈T ∈ Q is an optimal solution to (5).
Proof: Starting from t = T − 1, by substituting the
explicit expression for Qij∗m,t from (14), we have:
V˜n,l,t(Pn,l,t)
= min
Qn,l,T−1
∑
i,j
P in,l,T−1Q
ij
n,l,T−1(φ
ij
l,T−1+
L∑
m=1
almlog
Qij∗m,t
RijT−1
)
= min
Qn,l,T−1
∑
i,j
P in,l,T−1Q
ij
n,l,T−1(−all − λil,T−1)
= min
Qn,l,T−1
∑
i
P in,l,T−1(−all − λil,T−1)
∑
j
Qijn,l,T−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
= Vl,t(Pn,l,T−1)
Similarly, the proof can be repeated inductively for all t.
Since the final expression does not depend on Qn,l,t, any
allowable policy is a minimizer.
This result (all feasible solutions are optimal) can be
interpreted as the Wardrop’s first principle, which states
that at equilibrium,“the journey times on all the routes
actually used are equal, and less than those which would
be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route”
[21].
D. Finite number of drivers
Here, we want to study the relation between NE of the
game in the limit of infinite number of drivers and actual
game with finite number of drivers.
Definition 2: A set of strategies {QMFEn,l,t } is said to be
an MFE if the following conditions are satisfied.
• They are symmetric i.e.,
{QMFE1,l,t } = {QMFE2,l,t } = · · · = {QMFENl,l,t } ∀l, t
• There exists a sequence {Nl} a satisfying Nl ↘ 0 as
Nl →∞ with constant ratio of NlN such that for every
possible set of (n, l) and any allowable Qn,l,t ∈ Q,
J(n,l)(Qn,l, Q
MFE
−(n,l)) + Nl ≥ J(n,l)(QMFEn,l , QMFE−(n,l))
Theorem 2 summarizes our next main result which implies
that the solution to (6) is indeed MFE of the actual game.
Theorem 2: The symmetric strategy profile Qijn,l,t =
Qij∗l,t ∀n ≤ Nl where Qij∗l,t are obtained by Algorithm 1,
is the MFE of the road traffic game.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof provided in
[19, Theorem 2].
IV. NUMERICAL ILLUSTARTION
Here, we consider an example of routing game over a
traffic network (a grid world with obstacles). Team 1 and 2
are concentrated in the origin cells (indicated by 1S and 2S)
at t = 0. For t ∈ T , the travel cost for each driver is given
by:
Cijl,t =

Cl,term if j = i
1 + Cl,term if j ∈ V(i) and i 6= j
100000 + Cl,term if j 6∈ V(i) or j is an obstacle
where V(i) contains the cell i itself and its north, east,
south, and west neighboring cells. We introduce Cterm = 0 if
t 6= T−1 and Cterm = 10
√
dist(j,D) if t = T−1 to penalize
drivers if they end up far from their targeted destination,
where dist(j,D) is the Manhattan distance between the
drivers final location j and the destination cell (indicated by
1E and 2E). As the desired distribution, we use Rijt =
1
|V(i)|
(uniform distribution) for each i ∈ V and t ∈ T to incentivize
drivers to avoid concentrations.
Fig. 1. Density propagation of team one (red) and team two (blue) for
a11 = a22 = 3 and a12 = a21 = 2.
Fig. 2. Density propagation of team one (red) and team two (blue) for
a11 = a22 = 0.06 and a12 = a21 = 0.04.
For various values of A, the optimal policy is computed
based on Algorithm 1 for T = 50. Fig. 1 (a11 = a22 = 3
and a12 = a21 = 2) and Fig. 2 (a11 = a22 = 0.06
and a12 = a21 = 0.04) show the snapshot of population
distributions of teams 1 and 2 (respectively in the red and
blue) for intermediate time steps of t = 0, 15, 27, and
48. As expected, when aijs are small and the fixed cost
dominates, drivers will stay concentrated with higher level
of congestion. Conversely, when aijs are large and the
congestion associated tax is dominant, they would prefer to
spread more to lower the level of congestion.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, a log-population tax setting for the multi-
team routing game is proposed. Under this toll mechanism,
an approximation of the game in the large population limit
is obtained. It is shown the NE of the approximated game
can be efficiently computed by a linearly-solvable algorithm.
Furthermore, it is shown that the NE of approximated game
is indeed an MFE of a large but finite population game.
Providing a protocol to find the suitable values of mech-
anism’s parameters (Rijt and aij) is left unanswered, which
is worth investigating in future work. Practical application
of the results for congestion management in urban traffic
networks also remains to be explored. We also plan to study
the proposed framework from the viewpoint of mechanism
design theory.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a single term m 6= l. Then:
E
[
log(
Kijm,t
Kim,t
)− logRijt
]
=
E
[
log
Kijm,t
Nm
]
− E
[
log
Kim,t
Nm
]
− logRijt .
It is elementary to check that E
[
Kijm,t
Nm
]
= P i∗m,tQ
ij∗
m,t and
E
[
Kim,t
Nm
]
= P i∗m,t. However, since log(.) is an unbounded
function, we cannot directly deploy continuous mapping
theorem [22]. In the following, we show that if the general
random variable KNN
a.s.−−→ p has bounded variance σ2N , then
limN→∞ E log(KNN )→ log(p). Let δ be a number satisfying
0 < δ < p. Then, we can write log x = f1(x)+f2(x) where
f1(x) = max{log x, log δ}
f2(x) = 1{x≤δ} log x.
We first show limN→∞ Ef1(KNN ) = log p. By the strong law
of large numbers, we have KNN
a.s−−→ p. By the continuous
mapping theorem, f1(KNN )
a.s.−−→ f1(p). By the bounded
convergence theorem, we have
Ef1(
KN
N
)→ f1(p) as N →∞.
Next, we show limN→∞ Ef2(KNN ) = 0. Notice that
KN
N has
mean µN = p and covariance σ2N =
p(1−p)
N . We have
E
∣∣∣f2(KN
N
)
∣∣∣ = E1{KNN ≤δ}∣∣∣ log(KNN )− log δ∣∣∣
≤ E1{KNN ≤δ}
(∣∣∣ log(KN
N
)
∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ log δ∣∣∣) (10a)
≤ E1{KNN ≤δ}(| logN |+ | log δ|) (10b)
= Pr(
KN
N
≤ δ)(| logN |+ | log δ|)
= Pr(
KN
N
− µN ≤ δ − p)(| logN |+ | log δ|)
= Pr(|KN
N
− µN | ≥ p− δ)(| logN |+ | log δ|) (10c)
≤ p(1− p)
N(p− δ) (| logN |+ | log δ|) (10d)
→ 0 as N →∞.
From (10a) to (10b), we used the fact that 1 ≤ KN ≤ N
and thus | log KNN | is maximized when KN = 1. From (10c)
to (10d), the Chebyshev inequality
Pr(|KN
N
− µN ≥ |) ≤ σ
2
N

is used with  = p− δ . Finally,
lim
N→∞
E log
KN
N
=
lim
N→∞
Ef1(
KN
N
) + lim
N→∞
Ef2(
KN
N
) = log p.
For m = l, the same method can be repeated by µN = p− 1N
and σ2N =
p(1−p)
N−1 .
B. Proof of Theorem 1
For the base step of backward induction, let’s define
φijl,T−1 = C
ij
l,T−1. The Bellman equation (7) for t = T − 1
reduces to:
min
Qijl,T−1
∑
i,j
P il,T−1 Q
ij
l,T−1(φ
ij
l,T−1 +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qijm,T−1
RijT−1
)
s.t
∑
j
Qijl,T−1 = 1 ∀i. (11)
The associated Lagrangian is:
Ll,T−1(Qijl,T−1) =∑
i,j
P il,T−1Q
ij
l,T−1(φ
ij
l,T−1 +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qijm,T−1
RijT−1
)
+
∑
i
P il,T−1λ
i
l,T−1(
∑
j
Qijl,T−1 − 1).
The optimal solution Q∗ satisfies the stationarity condition:
∂Ll,T−1
∂Qijl,T−1
∣∣∣
Q∗
= P il,T−1(φ
ij
l,T−1 +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,T−1
RijT−1
)
+ P il,T−1all + P
i
l,T−1λ
i
l,T−1 = 0.
(12)
Equivalently:
log(
Qij∗1,T−1
RijT−1
)
...
log(
Qij∗L,T−1
RijT−1
)
 =
MijT−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
A−1
−a11 − φ
ij
1,T−1
...
−aLL − φijL,T−1
−A−1
ΛiT−1︷ ︸︸ ︷λ
i
1,T−1
...
λiL,T−1
 .
If we exponentiate both sides element-wise, we have:
Qij∗l,T−1 = R
ij
T−1 expM
ij
l,T−1 exp ([−A−1ΛiT−1]l). (13)
We can use the fact that
∑
j Q
ij∗
l,T−1 = 1 to see
[A−1ΛiT−1]l = log(
∑
j
RijT−1 expM
ij
l,T−1).
Consequently,
ΛiT−1 = A
log(
∑
j R
ij
T−1 expM
ij
1,T−1)
...
log(
∑
j R
ij
T−1 expM
ij
L,T−1)
 ,
By substituting ΛiT−1 in (13), Q
ij∗
l,T−1 is obtained explicitly.
Furthermore, (12) implies that:
φijl,T−1 +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,T−1
RijT−1
= −all − λil,T−1. (14)
Therefore, by definition:
Vl,T−1(Pl,T−1)
=
∑
ij
P il,T−1Q
ij∗
l,T−1(φ
ij
l,T−1 +
L∑
m=1
alm log
Qij∗m,T−1
RijT−1
)
=
∑
ij
P il,T−1Q
ij∗
l,T−1(−all − λil,T−1)
=
∑
i
P il,T−1(−all − λil,T−1)
∑
j
Qij∗l,T−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
∑
i
P il,T−1(−all − λil,T−1).
Plugging this value in the Bellman equation for t = T − 2
leads to a similar optimization to (11) with φijl,T−2 =
Cijl,T−2 − all − λjl,T−1 which completes the proof.
